By Juha Räikkä, Jukka Varelius
This quantity gathers jointly formerly unpublished articles targeting the connection among choice model and autonomy in reference to human enhancement and within the end-of-life context. the worth of person autonomy is a cornerstone of liberal societies. whereas there are various conceptions of the proposal, it truly is controversial that on any believable realizing of person autonomy an self sustaining agent must have in mind the stipulations that circumscribe its activities. but it has additionally been advised that permitting one’s innovations to impact one’s personal tastes threatens autonomy. whereas this phenomenon has acquired a few awareness in different components of ethical philosophy, it has seldom been thought of in bioethics. This ebook combines for the 1st time the themes of choice edition, person autonomy, and selecting to die or to reinforce human capacities in a different and entire quantity, filling an incredible wisdom hole within the modern bioethics literature.
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Additional info for Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life
In reply, I want to say that the first part of this objection is not an objection to the view that I have advocated in this paper and that the second part of this objection simply engages the genetic fallacy again. Indeed, I agree with the first part of the objection that if an agent is manipulated or brainwashed into having a preference, then merely endorsing the content of the preference from that brainwashed perspective is insufficient for the preference to be autonomous. Rather, as I pointed out while discussing Westlund’s view, the agent must be dialogically reflective.
Dorsey they alter the preferences we have in light of external circumstances, in particular, facts about the way the world is, or facts about what is available or unavailable to us (cf. Elster 1981). Adaptive preferences block one’s own genuine evaluative attitudes insofar as maintaining our genuine attitudes, given facts about the way the world is, is worse; it is painful, frustrating, or otherwise disadvantageous. And hence it would appear that the essential fact of adaptive preferences, the fact that renders them a phenomenon at all, is that these preferences interrupt or mask our own genuine point of view.
Though it may be rational13 for her to maintain this preference, such a preference lacks the normative roles we assign to normatively authoritative preferences. We should not believe, in other words, that performing in regional competitions is better for this person than performing in the Olympics would be, despite her endorsed adaptation. TA2 holds that a preference is autonomous insofar as the person whose preference it is maintains it on the basis of reasons. But as I have so far been at pains to argue, there are reasons to adapt one’s preferences, and hence saying that autonomous preferences are those that individuals maintain or possess on the basis of reasons isn’t going to solve the problem of normative authority.
Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life by Juha Räikkä, Jukka Varelius